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T he main objective of EU Cohesion Policy is to improve the long-term growth and employment prospects of the supported countries and regions. For this purpose, regions with a per capita income of less than 75% of the EU average can expect to receive considerable transfers from the EU in the context of the EU's Cohesion Policy ("Funds" hereafter). These amount to around 2.5% of GDP per year in New Member States on average and thus may have a considerable impact on aggregate demand in the economy. In the past, most of the supported Member States experienced relatively moderate rates of growth and had suffi cient spare resources in their labour markets. A positive demand shock as arising from the Funds was thus almost invariably welcome. The benefi ts associated with the Funds, however, may be different, if the supported economies already operate close to or above their current growth potential. In such a scenario, the additional demand stimulus from the Funds may exacerbate labour market bottlenecks, increase wages and prices and may thus contribute to an overheating of the economy. In addition and more generally, the pure size of the transfers has given rise to doubts as to the effective and productive absorption of these Funds. In particular, critics argue that the benefi ts of the Funds are smaller than under an optimal use of transfers for various reasons:
within an inadequate administrative environment, • transfers may be used for investment projects with zero or even negative return; extra resources for an adequate administrative han-• dling of the funds imply that these resources cannot be used for productive purposes;
as transfers provide rent-seeking incentives, there is • the risk of unproductive investments for the sake of catching a rent in the form of transfers.
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While during an economic downturn EU Cohesion Policy may have a stabilising impact on the economy, the contrary may be the case during periods of unsustainably high growth rates. Against this background, the question may be posed whether the EU Cohesion Policy and the associated generous spending is always adequate for the fast-growing central and east European Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (EU9). 2 In the following, this question is addressed by fi rst reviewing some key features of EU Cohesion Policy including the size of the Funds and their functional distribution. We then look in more detail at the demand effects of the Funds and at the mac- 
Some Key Features of EU Cohesion Policy
EU Cohesion Policy is fi nanced by three funds, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) ("Structural funds" hereafter), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. As Table  1 shows, between 2007 and 2013 around 82% of total Cohesion Policy funding will be used for countries and regions covered by the "Convergence objective". These are countries or regions whose per capita income (in PPS) is less than 75% of the EU average. This objective covers around 25% of the EU population including the EU9 countries almost entirely. 4 There are two views in the academic literature with regard to this part of the Cohesion Policy funding. On the one hand it is often argued that distributing some of the funding very widely will almost by defi nition not have any tangible impact. On the other hand it is stressed that giving some funding to all EU Member States is a politically unavoidable part of the political consensus-building needed to agree on the EU budget.
co-operation objective"). Overall, according to the provisions, the funds must not exceed 4% of GDP ("ceiling rule"). 6 In 2007 around 0.4% of EU27 GDP was spent on Cohesion Policy, falling back to 0.35% in 2013, which is comparable to the level in the early 1990s. 7 In nominal terms, Poland is by far the main recipient of Cohesion Policy related transfers with commitments under the "Financial Perspective 2007-13" reaching €67.3 billion, followed by Greece (€35.2 bn) and Italy (€28.8 bn). In % of GDP, the EU9 countries will be the biggest benefi ciaries of EU Cohesion Policy, with the allocated commitments ranging from 1.6% of GDP in Romania to 2.8% of GDP in Hungary and Lithuania (see Table 2 ). Commitments, i.e. spending allocations (in % of GDP) peak 5 For more details cf. including as a consequence of exchange rate changes", allocations will be adjusted accordingly. However, the adjustment may not exceed 3 billion euros per country (in the case of Romania 3 billion euros correspond to around ¼% of GDP per year over the period 2007-13).
To put the support for the EU9 countries during the 2007-13 period into perspective, Table 3 provides an overview of Cohesion Policy expenditures during the past two EU fi nancial programming periods for the main benefi ciaries prior to the 2004 enlargement, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal (EU4).
The intensity of fi nancial support peaked at around 3.7 and 4% of GDP during the 1994-99 period in Greece and Portugal respectively.
9 During the 2000-06 period the intensity of support (in % of GDP) declined in all EU4 countries given their progress with real convergence -in particular in the case of Ireland.
Structural funds are mainly used for three broad categories of expenditure: "infrastructure" (transport, telecommunications and information society, environment, energy), "human resources" (labour market policy including equal opportunities, social inclusion, education and vocational training and entrepreneurship) and "productive environment" (research and technological development, assistance to businesses including tourism, rural development, agriculture, forestry and fi sheries). Table 4 shows a considerable dispersion in countries' strategies to use the Funds. Whereas infrastructure was the main category of expenditure in Greece and Spain during the 1994-99 period, Ireland focussed during the same period mainly on human resources and in Portugal the largest share of the funding went to "productive environment". During the 2000-06 period the latter was the most popular type of activity in all EU4 countries, followed by infrastructure. However, the three very broad headline categories are likely to underestimate the importance of infrastructure in total expenditure. Measures taken in the fi eld of tourism or rural development for example tend to require considerable building activity as well.
In the course of 2007 the individual EU countries submitted their "National Strategic Reference Frameworks" (NSRFs) for approval by the European Commission, providing detailed information on the planned use of the allocated Cohesion Policy related funds over the 2007-13 period. While a comparison of the functional distribution of funds with the one observed over the 2000-06 period is diffi cult because the main chapters of Cohesion Policy have been redesigned, infrastructure projects are likely to account for a large share of Cohesion Policy related funds in the EU9 countries, in particular given the large infrastructure needs in these countries. The NSRF of Latvia, for example, foresees that around 70% of committed funds will be allocated to the improvement of infrastructure and public services, with the rest being allocated to the promotion of R&D, innovation and human capital accumulation. Under the rather conservative assumption that half of the funds allocated to projects in the area of infrastructure and public services require some building input, this would imply a persistent stimulus of around 1% of GDP for the construction industry in Latvia.
Macroeconomic Implications of the Funds in Fast-growing Economies
For assessing the demand effects of Cohesion Policy, one has to distinguish between commitments made within the Cohesion Policy framework and actual payments as the time profi le of actual payments under the EU Cohesion Policy can differ substantially from the time profi le of expenditure commitments. Table 5 gives information on the execution of Structural Funds, revealing that over the period 2004 to September 2007 the EU Member States which joined in 2004 on average were able to execute only 56% of the committed Structural Funds. As regards the Cohesion Fund, the ratio of actual payments to commitments was even as low as 22% for the same group of countries. As regards Bulgaria and Romania, the European Commission estimates that in 2007 the actual payments under the EU Cohesion Policy will reach only 37% and 23% of commitments respectively. A low rate of executed funds is indicative of poor administration and planning. This is rather problematic given that the empirical literature analysing the impact of EU Funds on economic growth emphasises that the quality of institutions is a key determinant of the success of the Funds in promoting long-run economic growth.
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As past experience shows, actual payments from the Funds tend to increase towards the end of the planning period due to "teething problems" at the start of the planning period.
11 Furthermore, Structural Funds are subject to an "additionality" principle, requiring that transfers from the EU must not substitute projects that would also have been implemented in the absence of fi nancial support from Structural Funds. In contrast, Cohesion Fund related transfers are allowed to replace national spending by up to 85%. To increase countries' incentives to use Structural Funds effi ciently, a co-fi nancing requirement was introduced into the Cohesion Policy framework. This necessitates that projects under Objective 1 ("Convergence") receive at least 25% (20% if the region is eligible for Cohesion Fund support) national fi nancial resources, while projects under Objectives 2 ("Regional competitiveness and employment") and 3 ("European territorial cooperation") require 50% of national resources, 10 Overall, the size of the estimated effects of the impact of EU funds on real GDP growth, though usually positive, differs signifi cantly across studies (see, e.g., S. 11 European Commission spending rules allow the funds to be carried over to the next year, although some restrictions apply. For structural funds the maximum carry-over period is n+3 years for commitments till 2010, reduced to n+2 years thereafter. According to calculations by the European Commission for the year 2007, the impact of structural and cohesion funds on the general government budget is negligible in % of GDP, i.e. 0.05% for Bulgaria and 0.03% for Romania, the countries for which these calculations have been presented.
12 This relates to the assumption that the direct impact of transfers on the budget balance is neutral as in the case of strict additionality the expenditure the government needs to spend on a project equals the additional revenue it receives from the EU transfer. As regards the indirect effects, transfers that are not subject to strict additionality may partly substitute for national expenditure (e.g. as is the case with cohesion funds). The budgetary impact for the transfer receiving country would thus be slightly positive on average. In general, the exact demand impact of the Funds depends on the assumptions regarding the amount of "additionality" within the co-fi nancing arrangements. 13 Given the 12 These calculations assume an absorption rate of 20%, a rate of 80% of transfers that go to the general government, an average cofi nancing rate of 15% for all funds and that 1/3 of the total structural and cohesion funds are not subject to a strict additionality requirement. It is further assumed that countries use to the maximum extent possible opportunities of substituting EU transfers for national spending. See European Commission: Public Finances in EMU -2007, Brussels 2007. The estimated aggregate budgetary impact of all EU transfers (including, inter alia, transfers from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as well as these countries' contributions to the EU budget) is much larger, i.e. 1.05% of GDP in Bulgaria and 0.37% of GD in Romania.
13 Rosenberg and Sierhey conclude that EU funds in the new EU Member States may have led to a fi scal drag of up to 1% of GDP in the fi rst years of membership, mainly due to co-fi nancing arrangements. Instead, Commission estimates show that the impact of EU funds on the national budgets may have been positive, arguing that as co-fi nancing is not subject to the "additionality" requirement, the related funds may be taken from other national budget lines. See C. R o s e n b e r g , R. S i e r h e y : Interpreting EU funds data for macroeconomic analysis in the New Member States ', IMF Working Paper No. 07/77, 2007. short-term "rigidity" of national budget lines, it can be assumed that national co-fi nancing is to a large extent additional in the short-run. 14 In principle, the extent to which co-fi nancing requirements lead to a need to mobilise additional resources can be limited by aligning projects with national spending priorities.
Although the Funds' main aim is to support the medium-term growth prospects of the supported countries and regions, EU Cohesion Policy can also have a considerable cyclical impact. Against this background it is interesting to look at recent macroeconomic conditions in the EU9 countries and to compare them with the situation in the EU4 countries during the two previous Cohesion Policy "programming periods", i.e. 1994-99 and 2000-06. Table 6 provides an overview of key macroeconomic indicators for the EU4 countries during the periods 1994-99 and 2000-06.
The average growth rate for the EU 4 countries was above the euro area average during both periods, indicating some catching-up, whereas the employment rate remained below, and the unemployment rate above the euro area fi gures. Given the importance of structural factors in labour markets, lower employment and higher unemployment rates are not necessarily clear indicators for the degree of spare capacity in the economy. Nevertheless, the stylised facts compiled in Table 6 suggest that the EU4 economies, the main benefi ciaries of the EU Funds during the periods 1994-99 and 2000-06, had at least as much if not more spare labour market capacity during these periods than the euro area average.
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Turning to the current macroeconomic environment in the EU9 countries, Table 7 provides an over-14 See European Commission, op. cit., pp. 277. 15 While real wages rose more strongly during the two periods in EU4 countries than in the euro area on average, real unit labour costs fell more strongly in EU4 countries. Another indicator for overheating is the external balance in the EU9 countries. Here the picture is rather mixed. Bulgaria, the Baltic countries and Romania all show external defi cits above 10% of GDP in 2007 (in the case of Bulgaria and Latvia even clearly above 20% of GDP) and, apart from Estonia, the current account defi cits for these countries are not expected to decrease below 10% of GDP until 2009. By contrast, the central European EU9 countries have signifi cantly smaller external imbalances. Current output gap estimates for the EU9 countries complete the picture and confi rm that the main benefi ciaries of the Funds during the 2007-13 period currently operate above potential growth, although to different degrees. Only in 2009 are the Baltic countries expected to experience a relatively large negative output gap.
Consequently, while the key rationale for the Funds is precisely to increase potential growth in the receiving countries, recent macroeconomic data for the EU9 countries illustrate that the additional demand stimulus due to EU Cohesion Policy may at times coincide with considerable external and internal economic imbalances. In other words, from a macroeconomic perspective Cohesion Policy may sometimes fi rst make matters worse before the expected positive supply side effects of the Funds help to overcome possible growth bottlenecks. 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The EU Funds that the EU9 countries will receive over the 2007-2013 period are lower as a percentage of GDP than those received by the largest recipients among EU15 countries in the past. However, in some EU9 countries Cohesion Policy transfers at times take place in a macroeconomic environment which is characterised by unsustainably fast growth. The resulting possible need to prevent the Funds contributing to economic imbalances may create additional challenges for the effi cient implementation of EU Cohesion Policy. In this respect, policy measures need to aim at reconciling possible confl icts between negative short to medium-run overheating effects and positive long-term growth effects of Cohesion Policy. Such policy measures can be grouped into two categories. First, measures within the operational confi nes of the Funds and, second, more general economic policy measures in the fi elds of monetary, fi scal and structural policy.
Turning to the fi rst set of measures, national governments that may face overheating problems should pay special attention to the macroeconomic environment when deciding on the sequencing of Cohesion Policy measures over the programming period. In countries with clear signs of overheating, postponing the implementation of EU-fi nanced projects may avoid further fuelling macroeconomic imbalances. The fact that in the recent past EU9 countries have been able to spend only about half the allocated cohesion-policy transfers might at times have helped "accidentally". The low rate of executed funds is, however, mainly due to shortcomings in administration and planning, which in fact puts the success of the Funds in terms of promoting long-run economic growth at risk.
Turning to more general policy measures, the guiding principle for economic policymakers should be to ensure that the additional demand stimulus from the Funds does not increase the risk of unsustainable, overheating-type developments. Preventing such developments requires a combination of monetary, fi scal and structural policy measures. 16 The extent to which monetary policy tools can be used depends largely on the chosen monetary and exchange-rate regime. In some countries the price stability objective is pursued by infl ation targeting while in other countries a fi xed exchange rate has been chosen. 17 These arrangements signifi cantly constrain the room for monetary policy to impact on domestic demand including a possible demand shock arising from the Funds.
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Given the limited contribution of monetary policy to macroeconomic stabilisation in a number of countries, fi scal policy needs to take greater responsibility. In fact, the cyclical situation in fast-growing countries may at times require more fi scal tightening, particularly when the additional infl ow of EU Funds is taken into account. This implies that these countries implement the co-fi nancing requirements by using existing budget lines, i.e. reducing expenditures on other budget items. At the same time, given that the construction sector, which is often a key driver of very fast growth, is likely to get a further boost from the EU Funds, tax benefi ts and subsidies relating to construction should be reviewed and possibly discontinued if there is indeed a risk of unsustainable developments in this part of the economy. More generally, tax and benefi t systems should be designed to maximise employment incentives, given the existing labour market shortages in these countries. In addition, governments need to ensure that public sector pay and benefi t increases do not lead to additional wage pressures in the private sector.
Finally, structural policy options cover a wide range of areas, including the housing/mortgage market. In addition, structural policy measures should be used to strengthen the supply side of the economy and to increase fl exibility. By their very nature these measures may only alleviate demand pressures in the medium term and are unlikely to be a "quick" solution to a possible excessive demand situation due to the infl ow of EU Funds. Nevertheless, in most EU9 countries there is room for improvement in a number of areas, ranging from the functioning of labour markets, agreements among social partners to ensure wage developments in line with productivity, enhancing FDI, increasing domestic competition and entry of foreign competitors, enhancing labour mobility, reducing labour market mismatches and addressing large regional disparities.
